




Environmental philosophy contains fractious elements, two of these being social eco-
logy and deep ecology. This study highlights and elaborates upon the fact that social
ecology and deep ecology actually have more in common than their respective pro-
ponents care to acknowledge, and identifies a major barrier between them which has
been with environmental philosophy since its inception some 30 years ago and still
persists to this day, namely the biocentric-anthropocentric divide.
Omgewingsfilosofie: interne spanning
Sosiale ekologie en diep ekologie is twee deelgebiede in omgewingsfilosofie wat me-
kaar onderling sterk opponeer. Wat ek hier aantoon en beredeneer, is eerstens dat
sosiale ekologie en diep ekologie meer met mekaar in gemeen het as wat hulle onder-
skeie woordvoerders wil erken. Tweedens dat die groot kloof wat tussen hulle be-
staan, ooreenstem met die spanning tussen biosentrisme en antroposentrisme, wat
omgewingsfilosofie sedert sy ontstaan 30 jaar gelede tot vandag toe kenmerk.
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Environmental philosophy is a very recent addition to the philo-sophical genre, its genesis being almost simultaneous with theAmerican proclamation of the first Earth Day in 1970. The
main thrust of environmental philosophy, also called environmental
ethics, is that if man’s abuse of the natural environment, the earth’s
life-support system, continues unabated then many, if not all, of the
planet’s life forms face the possibility of untimely extinction. Motiva-
ted by this possibility, philosophers, primarily in America, but also in
other parts of the world, began in the early l970s to address environ-
mental degradation. This took the form of a biocentric (nature-
centred and opposed to man-centred) environmental ethics. Since that
time biocentric environmental ethicists have been almost completely
absorbed with attempts, which continue to this day, to satisfactorily
explain and defend their position. My own current research is ground-
ed on the assumptions that environmental ethics is a very important
area of philosophical concern that should not be permitted to wither
away, and that unless significant reform is encouraged and effected
this fate is likely to overtake it.
To avoid this, it is essential to heighten awareness of the impor-
tance of environmental philosophy and in this way to encourage more
philosophers to research the subject with a view to advancing mea-
sures for its reform. Two positions within environmental ethics, so-
cial ecology (anthropocentric and reasonably well known) and deep
ecology (biocentric and very well known), both regarded as being in
the radical mould, are examined for their commonalities and diffe-
rences. In so doing, a destructive element, the rivalry between an-
thropocentrism and biocentrism in environmental philosophy, is
highlighted. There are three sections to this study. The first and se-
cond sections contain accounts of the background and the theory of
social ecology and deep ecology. The third presents a review of the
elements they have in common and those upon which they differ sig-
nificantly.
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1. Social ecology
Murray Bookchin, the architect of social ecology, was born in New
York in 1921 of immigrant parents who had been active in the Rus-
sian revolutionary movement in Tsarist times.
His biography, written by Janet Biehl, further reveals that he be-
longed to the Communist Youth Movement in the 1930s, was in the
US Army until 1940, and was involved with the United Auto Work-
ers (a highly libertarian union). He then became a libertarian socialist
and worked closely with German exiles (dissident Marxists) in New
York. He was writing on ecological issues in the 1950s, and his first
book published in the USA, Our synthetic environment (1962), preceded
Rachel Carson’s Silent spring by six months. His subsequent books in-
clude The ecology of freedom (1982), Remaking society (1989) and The
philosophy of social ecology (1990). Marshall (1992: 602) cites Bookchin
as the thinker who has most renewed anarchist thought and action
since World War II, having combined traditional anarchist insights
with modern ecological thinking.
Anarchist thinking is deceptive in that it is not about revolution
per se. The revolutionary element is there as a means to an end, that
end being the complete freedom of the individual so as to attain an
ideal form of existence, universal brotherhood in a communitarian
society. Anarchy is from the Greek anarkhos meaning “without a ru-
ler”, and in ordinary English usage means the absence of law and or-
der, resulting in disorder, lawlessness and chaos, the direct conse-
quence of the absence of government. In anarchist theory and prac-
tice, anarchism entails overthrowing the existing government in or-
der to obtain a society free of any form of government. Although
anarchism takes a number of forms, anarchists are united by a body
of common assumptions which include the understanding that man
is naturally capable of living in freedom and social accord. Although
not all may agree that man is naturally good, all would agree that
man is naturally social. Living in society, anarchists maintain, emer-
ged with man as he evolved from the animal world. This leads them
to the view that if society is a natural outcome, those who impose
man-made laws are the enemies of society (Woodcock 1971: 22-3).
Due to the conception of the natural origin of society, almost all
anarchists reject Rousseau’s social contract and Marx’s authoritarian
communism with its dictatorship of the proletariat. Four major revo-
lutionary events prompted the rise of anarchism: the Enlightenment
(the intellectual revolution of the eighteenth century), the Industrial
Revolution (beginning in Britain in 1760), the American War of In-
dependence (1775) and the French Revolution (1789).
Four men were instrumental in shaping the concept of anarchism:
William Godwin (English, 1756-1836), Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
(French, 1809-1865), Mikhail Bakunin (Russian, 1814-1876), and
Prince Peter Kropotkin (Russian, 1842-1921). All four were prolific
writers endowed with a great sense of purpose. Godwin, regarded as
one of the great libertarian thinkers, was not a revolutionary and re-
sisted any appeal to violence. He was “thrown up by the vortex of the
French Revolution ... [and he] sank when it subsided” (Marshall
1992: 191). Proudhon, of peasant origin, was self-educated, learned
Hebrew, Latin and Greek, read widely, wrote prolifically and became
a lifelong critic of existing society, wanting to install in its place,
through the proletariat, a new moral and social order (Joll 1979: 46,
50). The dignity of labour and its exploitation by the capitalist sys-
tem runs through all Proudhon’s writings. The idea of the worker’s
mission in the world is the basis of all subsequent anarchist thought
(Joll 1979: 51). Bakunin and Kropotkin were both of the Russian no-
bility and were both jailed, at different times, in the Peter and Paul
Fortress in St Petersburg for their revolutionary writings and actions.
Marshall (1992) believes Kropotkin to have been the most pro-
found anarchist thinker of the nineteenth century, basing this view
upon his attempt to ground anarchism in science and to move anar-
chism towards communism (Marshall 1992: 309). Murray Bookchin
(1990: 253) describes his anarchism-based social ecology as:
emerging out of a classical philosophical tradition which picks up
the organismic thread in Western ontological philosophy that runs
from Aristotle to Hegel, the social tradition initiated by Marx and
Kropotkin, and the historical perspective opened up by the age of
democratic revolution. It tries to advance a definition of nature as
an evolutionary phenomenon, in contrast to the largely ahistorical
images that abound in much of the current ecological literature.
113
Marshall/Environmental philosophy: rivalry within
M Bookchin’s The philosophy of social ecology: essays on dialectical na-
turalism (1990) and P Marshall’s Demanding the impossible: a history of
anarchism (1992) explicate the concept “social ecology”. Bookchin is
concerned with the relationship between human society and nature.
To further this relationship he rejects conventional reason which has
produced, among other things, destructive technologies. He endorses
dialectical reason, as developed by Hegel, which is supportive of the
understanding that existence is developmental, that is, always in the
stage of becoming.
Dialectical reason, in conjunction with ecology and the concept of
evolutionary development, shapes dialectical naturalism. Dialectical
naturalism adds an evolutionary perspective to ecological thinking
and is distinct from Hegel’s dialectical idealism and Marx’s dialectic-
al materialism. In dialectical naturalism potentiality inheres in all
things, and all are in the process of becoming, of developing, thus
there can be no end to development.
Development is therefore a continuum and the continuum is cu-
mulative, containing the entire history of a particular phenomenon.
Just as potential exists naturally in phenomena, it exists naturally in
society for the development of progress and happiness and this
should be explored to educe a more rational social dispensation. Dia-
lectical naturalism, linked with the phenomenal world of being and
becoming, contains an ethical element (inherent in the world itself)
and entails the view that ecological problems stem from social pro-
blems. Biological nature or “first nature” is the cumulative evolution
of complex life-forms. The fossil record tells the evolutionary story of
extraordinary fecundity and orderly continuity in nature. “Second na-
ture” is human society and human nature, the outcome of evolution
in first nature. Second nature is exemplified by hierarchy, class, the
state, private property, and a competitive market economy that obli-
ges economic rivals to grow at the expense of each other or perish.
From Bookchin’s anarchist viewpoint this is, to say the least, a dis-
turbing set of circumstances. To address this, Bookchin offers free na-
ture. Free nature is the name he has given to a new social and ecolo-
gical order, still to be realised, which it is hoped will result in an eco-
logical society.
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Bookchin, as Marshall (1992: 604) writes, places himself in the
utopian tradition and says that the power of utopian thinking lies in
a vision of society that questions all the presuppositions of present-
day society. Inspired by the ecological principles of unity in diversity,
spontaneity, and complementarity, Bookchin names his new ecolo-
gical/anarchist society ecotopia. The establishment of such a society
would entail a cultural as well as a social revolution.
A new ecological sensibility needs to develop in the place of all
hierarchical and domineering modes of thought. Ecological sensibi-
lity would be accompanied by a new animism from which a re-spiri-
tisation of the natural world would follow. In ecotopia there would be
freedom and equality, the latter based on the inequality of capacities,
needs and responsibilities, which results in, and it is intended to re-
sult in, an equality of unequals. Ecotopia would practice anarcho-
communism, which presupposes the abolition of private property,
the distribution of goods according to individual needs, the dissolu-
tion of commodity relationships, the rotation of work, and a reduc-
tion in the time devoted to labour (Marshall 1992: 611-3).
According to Bookchin the dominance of male over female has
also contributed to the current ills of society. He believes that the
male/female relationship in modern society should not be tolerated
and suggests that a return to a matriarchal society may be a way of
saving humanity. Necessitarian nature (whereby necessity is being
defined as unrelenting lawfulness and compulsion), whose ordered
functioning enabled modern scientific laws, is theistic in origin, pla-
cing man above nature. Necessitarian nature is hierarchical, a model
for hierarchical human society.
Against necessity Bookchin offers the autonomous individual’s
freedom to shape material life in a form that is ecological, rational
and artistic. Freedom enables the individual to go from desire to hap-
piness and then to pleasure, the latter being the satisfaction of sensu-
ous and intellectual desires. Pleasure is a spiritual as well as a physi-
cal condition since the essence of ecology, as Bookchin sees it, is a re-
turn to earthy naturalism (Marshall 1992: 612).
An ecological ethic of freedom cannot, Bookchin says, be separated
from politics. Diversity, he suggests, could be the source of freedom in
nature, together with participatory evolution, in which species play an
active role in their own survival and change. Participatory evolution,
Bookchin acknowledges, is at odds with the usual inferences of Dar-
winian evolution. Biocentrism, natural law, anti-humanism, and deep
ecology represent, as far as Bookchin is concerned, puerile thinking of
the worst kind. Biocentrism makes humans and viruses equal citizens
of a biospheric democracy.
When biocentrists, anti-humanists and deep ecologists assert that
life-forms have rights to life and fulfilment they are introducing hu-
man concepts from the social sphere into the natural world. Human
intervention in nature is inevitable, according to Bookchin, and eco-
logical ethics involves human stewardship of the planet. And it fol-
lows that Bookchin refutes any suggestion of a biospherical democra-
cy. Mankind is Bookchin’s focal point, and mankind’s logical connec-
tion with nature is encapsulated in the phrase “human consciousness
is nature rendered self-conscious” — this succinct and arresting
phrase is used frequently by Bookchin and is attributed by Marshall
(1992: 603) to Aristotle and to Johann Fichte, both of whom saw hu-
man consciousness as a manifestation of nature. Humanity, then, is a
product of natural evolution as well as a moral and ecological agent.
This being so, human beings have a clear responsibility toward the
natural world, arising from the unique qualities they possess.
What has been said so far concerning deep ecology gives a very
bland summary of Bookchin’s views. This quotation from Bookchin,
writing in the newsletter Green Perspectives under the heading “The
crisis in the ecological movement”, will redress the balance:
There is a major dispute in the ecology and Green movements to-
day. It is a dispute between social ecology and deep ecology, the
first, a body of ideas that asks that we deal with human beings pri-
marily as social beings [...] the second that sees human beings as ‘vi-
cious’ creatures who are subject almost entirely to the forces of na-
ture and are essentially interchangeable with lemmings, grizzly
bears (a favourite species) or for that matter, with insects, bacteria
and viruses (Bookchin 1988: 2).
Bookchin goes on to stress that the differences between social eco-
logy and deep ecology cannot be brushed aside. He then gives a brief
review of the two positions. Social ecology, he says, focuses on the
need to eliminate hierarchical relationships, emphasises the just de-
mands of the oppressed and calls for their freedom. It explores the
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possibility of harmonising our relationship with nature. It demands
sweeping changes that will abolish capitalism and replace it with an
ecologically oriented society based on free, confederated, humanly
scaled communities in which people will have direct control over
their personal and social lives.
Marshall (1992: 608) writes that Bookchin recognised the deve-
lopment of ancient Greek civilisation as a great step forward for hu-
manity. He admired the Greeks for having a teleological view of na-
ture, for not separating ethics and politics and for placing technolo-
gy (techne) in an ethical context. He admired the Greek city-state, the
polis, as it exemplified face-to-face democracy in action. It also mark-
ed the beginning of Western civilisation, Western philosophy and
ethics. Consequently Bookchin berates those who turn to Oriental
philosophy for inspiration, as our philosophical heritage is clearly oc-
cidental and not oriental. Deep ecologists, Bookchin writes, overlook
the profound social differences that divide human from human. They
see human beings as a biological lump called humanity which is pre-
sumably spiritually impoverished and anthropocentric in believing
that the world was made by a god exclusively for human enjoyment
and human ends.
With regard to Bill Devall and George Sessions’ Deep ecology:
living as if nature mattered (1985) Bookchin notes that it signals a shift
from the social to the spiritual. Thereafter, Bookchin (1988: 3) says,
the authors take “a complete nose-dive into Buddhism, Taoism, the
Christian tradition [...] and very significantly, Malthusianism”. The
economic forces which divide so much of humanity into the exploit-
ed and the exploiter are replaced by the sterile phrase “conflicting
world views”. The few social issues with which Devall and Sessions
began, fade into paeans to wilderness and critiques of natural re-
source conservation:
Besides a host of platitudes, what we need in addition to commu-
ning with nature and dissolving our burdensome selves into a cos-
mic organic wholeness, Devall and Sessions emphasise, is to turn
our ‘opponent into a believer’ (1985: 200). In short, we need the
personal touch: a festival of warmth, rituals, and a good dose of re-
ligion that tries to pass for politics (Bookchin 1988: 3).
Bookchin considers that the Earth First! movement and its epony-
mous periodical draw all the logical conclusions from deep ecology
which Devall and Sessions attempt to bury under metaphors, sutras,
and poetic evocations. Earth First! means what it says: the earth comes
before people. According to the periodical’s editor, David Foreman,
people are superfluous, perhaps harmful and definitely dispensable.
The central problem which deep ecology confronts, according to
Bookchin, is population growth. The impact of capitalism is men-
tioned only once, and that in passing.
If a market economy cannot produce cars, Bookchin says, it will
produce tanks. If it cannot produce clothing it will produce missiles.
These are basic principles of a grow-or-die economy, of which, as far as
Bookchin is concerned, deep ecologists are apparently oblivious. Deep
ecologists speak of a technological society instead of capitalism, con-
cealing the social relationships in industrial society, which is akin to
[throwing] cosmic stardust over [the] economic laws that guide ca-
pital expansion which Marx so brilliantly developed in his economic
writings, and [replacing] economic factors with zoological meta-
phors (Bookchin 1988: 5).
Herein lies the regressive character of deep ecology and Earth
First!, in Bookchin’s view. To call for a return to the Pleistocene, as
Earth First! has done, to degrade humanity as so many misanthropic
anti-humanists and biocentrists have done, is not only atavistic but
crudely reactionary. A degraded humanity will only yield a degraded
nature, as our capitalistic society and our hierarchical history have
amply demonstrated (Bookchin 1988: 6). If we are to bring society
and nature into accord with one another we must develop a move-
ment that fulfils the evolutionary potential of humanity and society.
We should turn the human world into a self-conscious agent of the
natural world:
All the eco-babble of Devall, Sessions, Naess and their acolytes
aside, if we do not intervene to act creatively in nature [...] we will
betray everything of a positive character that natural evolution itself
endowed us with — our potentially unprecedented richness of
mind, sympathy, and conscious capacity to care for nonhuman spe-
cies. Given an ecological society, our technology can be placed as
much in the service of natural evolution as it can be placed in the
service of a rational social evolution (Bookchin 1988: 5).
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Bookchin, stressing the characteristics that make mankind
unique among the earth’s life-forms, ends this brief acquaintance
with his merging of society and ecology. It is time now to hear from
the deep ecologists.
2. Deep ecology 
From Alan Drengson’s article “Ecophilosophy, ecosophy and the deep
ecology movement” (1999) elucidates three related concepts. The
aim of ecophilosophy is ecosophy or ecological wisdom. Ecophiloso-
phy fosters deeper and more harmonious relationships between place,
self, community and the natural world. Naess’s (1973: 95-100) ori-
ginal definition of ecosophy is as follows:
By an ecosophy I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony or equi-
librium. A philosophy, as a kind of Sofia (or) wisdom, is openly nor-
mative, it contains [...] rules, postulates, value priority announce-
ments and hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our universe.
Wisdom is policy wisdom, prescription, not only scientific descrip-
tion and prediction. The details of an ecosophy will show many va-
riations due to significant differences concerning not only the ‘facts’
of pollution, resources, population etcetera but also value priorities.
In 1973, the deep ecology movement was introduced by the Nor-
wegian philosopher Arne Naess. Environmentalism emerged as a po-
pular grass-roots political movement in the 1960s with the publica-
tion of Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring. Those already involved in
conservation and preservation efforts were joined by many others con-
cerned about the detrimental environmental impact of modern indus-
trial technology.
Naess’s article in Inquiry (1973) was preceded by a talk in Bucha-
rest at the Third World Future Research Conference (1972) in which
the background of the ecology movement was discussed. A moun-
taineer who had climbed in many parts of the world, Naess had had
the opportunity to observe political and social action in diverse cul-
tures. He identified two distinct forms of environmentalism. One he
called the “long-range deep ecology movement” and the other the
“shallow ecology movement”. The “deep” movement involves deep
questioning, right down to fundamentals, while the shallow stops
before the ultimate level. The platform principles of the deep ecology
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movement (DEM) emerge from below, and so deep ecology is called
a grass-roots movement (in the Gandhian tradition), as opposed to
“top-down” hierarchies.
In his paper Naess explained the difference between the short-
term shallow and the long-range deep ecology movements in broad
terms. The distinctive aspect of the deep ecology movement is its re-
cognition of the inherent value of all living beings, and of the inhe-
rent worth of diversity of all kinds. This awareness is used to shape
environmental policies and actions. We must make fundamental
changes in basic values and practices or we will destroy the diversity
and beauty of the world, and its ability to support diverse human
cultures. In order to state the shared objectives of the movement, a
platform is usually put forth, presenting general principles intended
to unite the movement. Naess and others such as Sessions have pro-
posed a set of eight principles to characterise the deep ecology move-
ment as part of the general ecology movement (1984). These prin-
ciples are endorsed by people from a diversity of backgrounds who
share common concerns for the planet.
The Platform Principles of the Deep Ecology Movement:
• The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on 
earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inhe-
rent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the
non-human world for human purposes.
• Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realisation
of these values and are also values in themselves.
• Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except 
to satisfy vital human needs.
• The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a 
substantial decrease of human population. The flourishing of 
non-human life requires such a decrease.
• Present human interference with the non-human world is exces-
sive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
• Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic 
economic, technological, and ideological structures. The result-
ing state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
• The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality 
(dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to
an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a pro-
found awareness of the difference between big and great.
• Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation
to directly or indirectly try to implement the necessary changes.
Sometimes people confuse the “deep ecology movement”, as des-
cribed above, with Naess’ own ultimate ecocentric philosophy Ecoso-
phy T. It is on the basis of Ecosophy T that Naess personally supports
the platform principles of the deep ecology movement. Ecosophy T
is deeply influenced by Norwegian friluftsliv (a movement celebra-
ting outdoor life), Gandhian non-violence, Mahayana Buddhism and
Spinozan pantheism. T refers to Tvergastein, Naess’s mountain hut
in Norway, where much of Ecosophy T was worked out. The T also
refers to the Norwegian word for interpretation (tolkning) which is
central to his philosophy of language and communication.
A basic norm in Naess’s Ecosophy T is “Self-realisation! — for all
beings”. The Self to be realised for humans is not the ego, or self
(lower case s), but the larger ecological Self. This self/Self distinction
has affinities with Mahayana Buddhism. Naess says we can realise our
ecological Selves in a number of ways, particularly by extension of
identification. He assumes the person to be well integrated and to
have a healthy ego so as to avoid projection of the small self and its
shadow. The exclamation marks the fact that this is not mere descrip-
tion, but describes something that ought to exist. Naess regards Self-
realisation as the basis for his own lived ecosophy, and urges others to
develop their own ecosophies. His own approach is to extend his
sense of identification to a larger sense of Self. Human beings can na-
turally connect with a much larger sense of Self, transcending ego, by
extending our sense of identification to a wider sphere of relation-
ships. It is not difficult to identify with other living beings. Many
other authors have developed ecosophies very similar to Naess’s, ba-
sed on the idea of extending awareness and care to a larger ecological
Self. However, other supporters of the deep ecology movement have
ecosophies which do not start with “Self-realisation!”.
Drengson says that he and Warwick Fox have both observed that
the extension of self and the idea of the ecological Self, overlap in
many ways with work in transpersonal psychology. Fox called these
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self-realisation types of ecosophies transpersonal ecologies. Today we
call them transpersonal ecosophies and their psychological study is
transpersonal ecology. Creation theology (which has a long history as
a minority tradition in Christianity) is a transpersonal ecology. In the
form of a Christian philosophy and practice, creation theology finds
the Christ principle and the power of love revealed in the ongoing
creation of the world and requires us to revere this. A Mahyana Bud-
dhist, concerned for the deliverance of all sentient beings, can also
easily support the deep ecology movement principles.
No supporters of the deep ecology movement could be anti-human.
Some vociferous environmentalists who claim to be supporters of the
movement have said and written things that are misanthropic in tone.
They have not explained how such statements are consistent with a
commitment to platform principle number one, which recognises not
merely the worth but the inherent worth of all beings, including hu-
man beings. Supporters of the deep ecology movement support
Gandhian non-violence in word and deed. Naess claims to be a sup-
porter of the ecofeminist, social ecology, social justice, bio-regional and
peace movements. He believes that the platform principles of the deep
ecology movement are broad enough to be inclusive to this extent.
Another dispute has centred on the critique of anthropocentrism
offered by some supporters of the deep ecology movement. Feelings of
warmth and admiration for other human beings are consistent with
the principles of the deep ecology movement. What is inconsistent is
a refusal to recognise the inherent worth of other beings. Such a refu-
sal permits the exploitation and destruction of life forms purely for
human convenience and profit. Anthropocentrism as a bias against
other life forms fails to recognise that we are part of these lives and
they are part of ours. Our human self in the deepest sense is insepa-
rable from the earth from which we have grown. Anthropocentrism is
objectionable when it emphasises “Humans first!” regardless of the
consequences to other beings. If one accepts the platform principles of
the deep ecology movement, one is committed to respecting the in-
trinsic values of richness and diversity.
This in turn leads, according to Drengson, to a critique of indus-
trial society. Industrial culture represents itself as the only acceptable
model for progress and development. However, application of this
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model and its financial and technological systems to all areas of the
planet results in the destruction of habitat, the extinction of species,
and the destruction of indigenous cultures. If we do not accept the
industrial development model, Drengson goes on to say, endorsing
the deep ecology platform principles might lead us to study the eco-
sophies of aboriginal and indigenous people so as to learn from them
values and practices that can help us to dwell wisely in neighbouring
places. Supporters of the deep ecology movement embrace place-spe-
cific, ecological wisdom and vernacular technology practices. No one
philosophy and technology is applicable to the whole planet (Dreng-
son 1999: 1-9). Drengson’s article appears to have been written, in
part, to evoke support for the deep ecological movement.
The article “Deep ecology: a new philosophy of our time?” by
Warwick Fox (1984) offers more detail. Fox introduces deep ecology
by noting its eclecticism. He says that if he were to omit Buddhist
visionaries and Taoist physics, mystical traditions, and new physics
(post-1920s), he might well have missed the central intuition of deep
ecology. Fox distinguishes between shallow and deep ecology in that
shallow ecology views human beings as separate from their environ-
ment, the source of all value, and non-human beings as of instru-
mental value only. Shallow ecology is accordingly anthropocentric
and supports the belief that the environment should be preserved be-
cause of its value to human beings (Fox 1984: 194). Deep ecologists
see organisms as knots in a biospherical net or as in a field of intrinsic
relations. The non-anthropocentric view of humanity is advanced as
just one strand in the web of life. The intrinsic value of non-human
members of the biotic community is recognised, as is their right to
pursue their own evolutionary destinies, and this is taken as an intui-
tively clear value axiom. This is in sharp contrast to the view that hu-
man beings are the source of all value, a view which is regarded by
deep ecologists as arrogant conceit (Fox 1984: 194). Shallow ecology
endorses mechanistic materialism. Deep ecology criticises mechanis-
tic materialism and seeks to replace it with “unity in process”, mean-
ing that all things are fundamentally related and that these interre-
lationships are in a “process” of dynamism, of instability, of novelty,
of creativity (Fox 1984: 194-5). This conception, Fox continues,
lends itself to an organismic understanding which in turn leads to
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panpsychic or pantheistic conceptions rather than dead-matter con-
ceptions of the non-human world (Fox 1984: 195). Western philoso-
phers such as Spinoza, Whitehead and Heidegger are often invoked
to assist in the articulation of deep ecology’s vision of the world.
Deep ecology has great respect for Eastern spiritual traditions and
the myths of non-Western peoples. Deep ecology therefore stresses the
interconnection between ethics and metaphysics and recognises that
an ecologically effective ethics can arise only from a “more persuasive
and more enchanting cosmology than that of mechanistic material-
ism” (Fox 1984: 195). Shallow ecology endorses a policy of economic
growth for all societies. Deep ecology seeks to address the existing
social, political, and economic order and to substitute ecological sus-
tainability. The key concepts of deep ecology’s social, political and
economic vision are a just and sustainable society which exhibits the
following characteristics: concern for carrying capacity, as well as for
cultural and biological diversity; local autonomy and decentralisation;
soft energy paths; appropriate technology; re-inhabitation, and bio-
regionalism. Re-inhabitation means learning to live in and care for an
area degraded by industrial development. Bio-regions are areas with
common characteristics of soils, flora and fauna. These bioregions
should replace nation-states as the fundamental unit in which human
beings live. The human carrying capacity of each bioregion should be
determined so that they can be supported adequately for their needs
and intrude on their environment only minimally (Fox 1984: 195).
Deep ecologists are willing to trust their inner voices in the hope
that the dominant social paradigm (within which the moral commu-
nity is situated) will disintegrate — although in a creative rather
than a destructive manner (Fox 1984: 196).
I should note here that the disintegration of the dominant social
paradigm is a necessary prelude to the establishment of bioregions in
a creative manner and that this process is akin to Bookchin’s vision
which necessitates, in the first instance, the overthrow of the existing
social, economic and political order. The central intuition of deep
ecology is that there is no ontological divide in the world. The world
is not divided existentially into subjects and objects or into human
and non-human. Deep ecology rejects the dualism which has been
the dominant theme of Western philosophy, in favour of unity. Deep
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ecologists identify their position with Taoist and Zen teachings and
with the new physics, the former erasing any duality of being, and
the latter reinforcing this view. What is structurally similar in these
cosmologies (both the mystical traditions and the new physics) is
that they have a view of the universe as a “seamless web” (Fox 1984:
196). New physics conceives of space as a tremendous ocean of energy
in which matter itself is merely a small ripple. We are therefore re-
quired to adjust our understanding of matter, for what is implied is
a reality far beyond what we call matter (Fox 1984: 196).
The mystical traditions and the new physics generate what could
be called an ecological awareness of the fundamental inter-relatedness
of all things and events, of an unbroken wholeness that denies the idea
of a world of separate and independently existing parts (Fox 1984:
196-7). There is thus a shift in thinking from the classical Greek and
Cartesian concepts of the universe as essentially atomistic, divisible,
static, non-relativistic and comprehensible by reductionism. Deep
ecology embraces this shift from the old to the new. The ontology can
now be described as dynamic, fluid, holistic, interdependent, self-
consistent, paradoxical, probabilistic, infinitely over-determined and
seamlessly linked to the consciousness of the observer (Fox 1984:
198). Deep ecology’s concept of biospherical egalitarianism has the
effect of condemning as anthropocentric Christian ethics, Western
secular ethics such as utilitarianism, and modern economic theory
(Fox 1984: 198).
Recently, there have been attempts to develop a practical ecologi-
cal ethics. This would include the intrinsic value of the non-human
world, as well as the belief that human beings are not the bearers of
all value and that complex organisms (whales, dolphins, etcetera)
possess comparable value. The main thrust would be to maximise the
richness of experience in general and this includes the richness of ex-
perience of the non-human world (Fox 1984: 198). But the reality is,
as Naess points out, that value conflicts can never be completely
avoided in practice, for in the process of living, human beings and
non-human beings are involved in some form of killing, exploitation
and suppression (Fox 1984: 198). This poses a challenge to deep eco-
logists and unless they employ a workable definition of anthropocen-
trism they may well become known as the advocates of Procrustean
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ethics (producing conformity through violence or ruthless methods)
as they attempt to fit all organisms into the same dimensions of in-
trinsic value.
Perhaps, Fox continues, deep ecologists have lost sight of the
“process” in their concept of “unity in process”, for any process pro-
duces uneven distributions including different values that have vari-
ous attributes. These attributes in the “process of the world” (Fox
1984: 199) may be money, information, complexity of relations etc.
If this were not the case there would be no process, only a uniform
and lifeless field. Consequently it should be clear that the central in-
tuition (unity in process) does not entail an understanding that in-
trinsic value is spread evenly across the entire membership of the bio-
tic community. So in situations of genuine value conflict, justice is
better served by not subscribing to ecological egalitarianism. How-
ever, the lesson of ecology, in the shallow sense, is that we do share
one another’s fate, as we all share the fate of the earth. The message
of deep ecology is that we ought to care deeply about the fate of the
earth, not because it affects us, but because it is us (Fox 1984: 200).
To conclude this section, I should like to quote four extracts from
Devall and Sessions’s Deep ecology: living as if nature mattered (1985)
which vividly characterise the deep ecology movement:
• Naess believes there are too many humans on the planet (<http://
www.envirolink.org/enviroethics/deepindex2.html>).
• “[...] in Deep Ecology, we ask whether the present society fulfils
basic human needs like love and security and access to nature.
And in so doing, we question our society’s underlying
assumptions” (<http://www.envirolink.org/enviroethics/deep
index2.html>).
• “Ecological consciousness and deep ecology are in sharp contrast
with the dominant world view of technocratic-industrial socie-
ties, which regards humans as isolated and fundamentally sepa-
rate from the rest of nature, as superior to, and in charge of, the
rest of creation. But the view of humans as separate and superior
to the rest of Nature is only part of larger cultural patterns. For
thousands of years, western culture has become increasingly ob-
sessed with the idea of dominance, with dominance of humans
over non-human Nature, masculine over feminine, wealthy and
powerful over the poor, with dominance of the West over non-
Western cultures. Deep ecological consciousness allows us to see
through these erroneous and dangerous illusions” (<http://www.
envirolink.org/enviroethics/deepindex2.html>).
• “[...] Insofar as these deep feelings are religious, deep ecology has
a religious component, and those people who have done the most
to make societies aware of the destructive way in which we live in
relation to natural settings have had such religious feelings”
(<http://www.envirolink.org/enviroethics/deepindex2.html>).
I now turn to the commonalities and significant differences that
exist between social ecology and deep ecology. This discussion will
serve to illustrate my contention that social ecology and deep ecology
have more in common than their proponents care to acknowledge.
3. The common elements and significant differences 
between social ecology and deep ecology
3.1 Common elements
• Social ecology and deep ecology were each initiated by a single in-
dividual, and endorse the freedom of the individual.
• Both social ecology and deep ecology are eclectic, drawing on a
wide spectrum of ideas in support of their theories.
• The overthrow of the present social, political and economic order
in the Western world is advocated by both social ecology and
deep ecology — social ecology by means of revolution, deep eco-
logy by non-violent means (these are different methods of effect-
ing the same end, the demise of a system, in order to replace it
with another).
• Both social ecology and deep ecology propose a return to a simple
communitarian lifestyle — for deep ecology, this should be in
bioregions replacing nation-states, and for social ecology in com-
munities free of any form of government.
• Social ecology and deep ecology are both utopian in that they pro-
ject an image of an ideal society which is not apparently realisable
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now, or in the near future. Furthermore, to overthrow a particular
government, whether by revolutionary or non-violent means, is a
major undertaking. To attempt this on a global scale would be a
monumental task which could presumably not be accomplished
without enormous bloodshed and vastly increased environmental
damage.
• Both social ecology and deep ecology support the understanding
that man is a product of the evolutionary process of nature.
• Both movements attach great importance to human and non-
human diversity and are committed to the welfare of the non-
human world.
• Equally, social ecology and deep ecology both denounce hierarchy
and domination, including the dominance of the human male
over the human female.
• Social ecology and deep ecology both have a religious emphasis
— that of social ecology derives from ancient animism, the belief
that spirits inhabit all of the natural realm, rivers, mountains, etc,
and that of deep ecology finds its source in Christianity and in
Eastern religions.
3.2 Significant differences
• Social ecology is politically driven while deep ecology is spiritu-
ally driven.
• Social ecology’s view is anthropocentric; that of deep ecology is
biocentric.
• Social ecology regards hierarchy as its primary target, whereas deep
ecology regards human population reduction as its primary target.
As has been shown, the elements common to social ecology and
deep ecology far outweigh the differences between them. But the dif-
ferences remain significant.
The first significant difference between social ecology and deep
ecology is that although Bookchin’s social ecology embraces animism,
it is primarily politically driven, while deep ecology is primarily
spiritually driven. This distinction produces, on the one hand, a
politically inspired worldview dependent upon matters of fact (social
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ecology) and, on the other, a religiously inspired worldview, dependent
upon human intuition and theological inspiration (deep ecology).
The second significant difference is that the biocentrism of deep
ecology includes the concept of biospherical egalitarianism (the equal
intrinsic value of all members of the biosphere) which has the effect of
condemning as anthropocentric Christian ethics and Western secular
ethics such as utilitarianism and modern economic theory (Fox 1984:
198). Thus the biocentrism of deep ecology evokes a contradiction
between the approval of Christianity and Christian ethics on the one
hand and their condemnation as anthropocentric on the other.
With regard to the approval of Christianity, it will be recalled
that Drengson wrote of certain ecosophies as being transpersonal eco-
logies. He called Christian creation theology such an ecology, because
it takes the form of a Christian philosophy that finds the Christ prin-
ciple and the power of love revealed in the ongoing creation of the
world. Drengson wrote in the same paragraph about the supporters
of deep ecology and cited ecofeminists, social ecologists and Chris-
tians. While it is clear that ecofeminists and Christians are suppor-
ters of deep ecology, why would social ecologists be included? Pepper
(1996: 31) writes that support for deep ecology comes from social
ecologists and eco-socialists because deep ecology is that deep ecolo-
gy, like social ecology, contains elements of anarchism (Pepper 1996:
31) in its determination to overthrow the current Western social,
economic and political order. Social ecology’s solution to the hierar-
chy and aggression of state-dominated patriarchal societies is to eli-
minate hierarchy and patriarchy so as to recreate a “natural” society.
Drengson (1999: 1-9) also wrote on anthropocentrism, that it re-
presents a refusal to recognise the inherent worth of other beings and
promotes exploitation and destruction of life forms purely for human
convenience and profit. His objection to anthropocentrism also in-
cludes its emphasis of “Humans First!”. This is the opposite of “Earth
First!”, the activist arm of deep ecology.
At this point, another contradiction arises in deep ecology. “Earth
First!” is identified by List (1993: 2) as a form of radical environmen-
talism. Radical environmentalism, according to List, is a wilderness
fundamentalism backed up by deep ecology and biocentrism which
makes wilderness and wild species the focus of uncompromising po-
litical action. This takes the form of environmental civil disobedience,
ecotage and monkeywrenching. Environmental civil disobedience
refers to the type of non-violent direct confrontation initiated by
Greenpeace. Ecotage means the sabotaging of environmental abusers,
in the main corporate polluters. This is effected by the instigation of
law suits, boycotts, marches, strikes and harassment. Monkeywrench-
ing refers to the active sabotaging of the machinery of the industria-
lised state. As an example of “Earth First!” in action, List (1993: 255)
relates the arrest of David Foreman, founder of “Earth First!”, by the
FBI for conspiring to sabotage two nuclear power plants and a facility
that manufactures triggers for nuclear bombs. This form of monkey-
wrenching by “Earth First!” potentially puts great numbers of inno-
cent human beings and many other species at risk of a nuclear explo-
sion. Yet the first of Naess’ platform principles for the deep ecology
movement is “the well-being and flourishing of human and non-
human life”. The attempted sabotage of nuclear power stations thus
contradicts deep ecology’s first principle.
The third significant difference between the two movements is
that social ecology regards hierarchy as a primary target while deep
ecology aims primarily at the reduction of the human population.
With respect to social ecology and its primary target, hierarchy,
Marshall (1992: 604) notes that Bookchin, not wanting to use the
clichéd language of the past (proletariat, masses, class, exploitation)
preferred the term hierarchy to class, and domination to exploitation.
By hierarchy (which was to be overthrown in order to bring about a
communitarian society), Bookchin meant not only a social condition
but a state of consciousness. It involved the cultural, traditional and
psychological systems of obedience and command as well as the
economic and political systems of class and state. Bookchin based his
arguments for a free society on the findings of anthropology, and on
human history and prehistory. Bookchin suggested that hierarchy
and domination arose in the division of labour of the hunter-
gatherers of prehistory, while a sense of community and co-operation
became important in agricultural society. With regard to deep ecolo-
gy and its primary target, the reduction of the human population,
Devall & Sessions (1985) quote Naess as saying: “I think we must
have no more than 100 million people if we are to have the variety of
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cultures we had one hundred years ago” (<http://www.envirolink.
org/enviroethics/deepindex2.html>).
Neither deep ecology nor social ecology is without fault. In his
article “Social ecology, deep ecology, and liberalism”, diZerega (1993:
313-4) presents two criticisms of Bookchin’s social ecology. The first
is that Bookchin does not understand the problems of scale, and the
second that his view of competition and co-operation in the market
economy and in nature is too simplistic, indicating that he under-
stands neither markets nor ecosystems.
The problem of scale relates to Bookchin’s concept of a free soci-
ety, Ecotopia, in which people will live in small communities. diZere-
ga contends that the positive aspects of small communities stem from
everyone’s knowing and being interested in everyone else, as do the
negative aspects: that people in small communities are traditionally
hostile to strangers, that large cities (in comparison with small com-
munities) generally spawn creativity in the arts and sciences, that
small communities have historically been the scene of countless feuds
and petty wars, and that a complex modern economy cannot possibly
be based on face-to-face small communities (diZerega 1993: 314-6).
diZerega (1993: 316) also notes that small communities require im-
personal co-ordinated infrastructures for the distribution of goods
and services. A number of diZerega’s comments are clearly justified,
yet he appears to be thinking of the economies of small communities
as smaller versions of large modern market economies. Bookchin’s
concept of small communities is markedly different in that it is based
on anarcho-communism, which entails the abolition of private pro-
perty, the distribution of goods according to individual needs, the
dissolution of commodity relationships, the rotation of work and the
reduction of the time devoted to labour.
In Bookchin’s free society, as Marshall (1992: 613-4) writes,
everyone would receive the basic minimum on which to live and
would give freely without any consideration of return. The market
economy would be transformed into a moral community, changing
the way in which members relate to one another. Care, responsibility
and obligation would be the new terminology, replacing interest,
cost and profitability. The basic units of a federated society of com-
munes (ecocommunities) would be designed to comply with local
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ecosystems and there would be a balanced mix of small-scale agricul-
ture and small-scale industry. Marshall gives a much more extensive
view of Bookchin’s communitarian ideas but enough has been stated
here to show that Bookchin and diZerega have very different views
regarding small communities. It must also be borne in mind that
Bookchin is not creating a blueprint for the actual establishment of
ecocommunities in the immediate future; he is writing about an Eco-
topia, a vision of what things could be like (although he does believe
the vision to be attainable).
diZerega also criticises Bookchin’s view of competition and co-
operation, as they occur in the market and in nature, as too simplistic,
indicating that he understands neither markets nor ecosystems. When
Bookchin writes about market relationships, diZerega says, the mar-
ket is competitive rather than co-operative. diZerega, on the other
hand, maintains that the market is competitive as well as co-operative
and he details various levels of market competitiveness, including
competition between all goods offered for sale, between producers of
similar goods, and between the businesses selling the goods. Boo-
kchin’s dismissal of competition is necessary, says diZerega (1993:
320-2), if his utopia is to sound plausible, but it is bad ecology and
bad social science. Writing about co-operation in the market system,
diZerega (1993: 322) says that there must be co-operation between
suppliers of raw materials and those who produce the goods. This is
obviously the case, but if the suppliers are in one country and the
producers in another, as is so often the case today, then co-operation
depends upon communication. And this would seem to be substan-
tiated by the fact that businessmen are constantly flying all over the
world to communicate face-to-face in order to cement interpersonal
relations and to secure or further contractual arrangements. diZerega
(1993: 322) also notes that co-operation should exist in a firm’s in-
ternal organisation and that this is increasingly recognised. But this,
I suggest, all has to do with the firm’s policy and little to do with co-
operation in the market system. Early economists fascinated with
how outcomes beneficial to society, could arise from narrowly self-
interested motives produced theoretical models based on the self-
interested man. Today this figure is called “economic man” and he
dominates economic theory to the extent that he has blinded most
132
Acta Academica 2001: 33(3)
economists to many co-operative possibilities within the market
(diZerega 1993: 322). Of these many possibilities diZerega cites only
two: successful worker-owner co-operatives and successful Spanish co-
operatives. diZerega’s focus then turns back to Bookchin and he writes:
co-operation and competition do not exist along a continuum, nor
are they opposites; who competes, who co-operates and how are the
relevant questions when examining any social institution, not whe-
ther competition or co-operation exist. Both do and probably always
will (diZerega 1993: 322-4).
In summing up, diZerega (1993: 325) notes that Bookchin’s so-
cial ecology stretches the process of nature and “mutilates those of
the market, so that he may fit them into the facile categories of dia-
lectical naturalism”. What Bookchin proposes is limited and this af-
fects his criticism accordingly. diZerega’s criticism of Bookchin’s
contention that the market is competitive while ecosystems are co-
operative may be taken as fair comment.
Certainly social ecology is not without blemish, as Marshall (1992:
622) confirms:
For all the shortcomings of his Hegelian teleology, his naturalistic
ethics, his faith in modern technology and his confidence in the pros-
pect of economic abundance, Bookchin stands as an outstanding so-
cial thinker. His style may be difficult at times and his tone unduly
virulent, but his thought is remarkably fresh and stimulating. Above
all, he has brilliantly renewed anarchist theory and practice by com-
bining libertarian and utopian ideas with ecological principles in the
creative synthesis of social ecology.
diZerega (1993: 331), writing on deep ecology, which he supports,
says deep ecologists argue that ecological reasoning is a radical chal-
lenge to Western Prometheanism as it promises to reintegrate huma-
nity into the natural world. In this sense, diZerega continues, deep
ecology is biocentric rather than anthropocentric.
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4. Conclusion
This brief investigation into environmental philosophy was under-
taken to heighten awareness of the importance of this branch of phi-
losophy; an importance which cannot be overstated, for as humanity’s
expectations of the good life have grown apace, so too have our num-
bers. In combination, these two factors have placed more and more
pressure on the earth’s fragile life-support system. Secondly, as a hu-
man generation is approximately thirty-five years, almost a whole ge-
neration has passed since environmental philosophy began, and
another generation will soon begin. Although it has been shown that
there are many similarities between the two positions discussed, ri-
valry persists. The generation that initiated environmental philoso-
phy should not bequeath it to the next generation still blighted by
the division between anthropocentrism and biocentrism.
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